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when they interpret statutes informally under the standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co. A key
reason why courts defer to agencies is that agencies are more politically accountable than courts.
Current legal scholarship, however, reflects an outdated view of accountability that does not
reflect the insights of modern political science. Modern political scientists emphasize that agency
officials are held accountable through a variety of mechanisms beyond formalistic procedures or
direct electoral ties to the populace. The Note correspondingly offers an innovative justification
as well as a fresh critique of a substantial body of cases implementing the Skidmore standard.
Furthermore, this Note suggests a model for how courts should handle informal agency
interpretations of statutes. Courts could compare their treatment of such decisions to the familiar
standard of "persuasive precedent." This proposed Skidmore standard is largely consistent with
recent Supreme Court precedent, though the Court should still benefit from clarification of the
doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
But the Administrator's policies are made in pursuance of official duty,
based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and
information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case....
The fact that the Administrator's policies and standards are not reached
by trial in adversary form does not mean that they are not entitled to
respect.
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co.'
With the landmark decision United States v. Mead Corp.,2 the Supreme
Court breathed new life into the administrative law classic Skidmore v. Swift &
Co. In Mead, the Court ruled that there are essentially two types of statutory
interpretation by government agencies.' The first category, formal
interpretations, occurs in notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal
adjudicatory proceedings when Congress has clearly delegated lawmaking
authority to the agency. The second category, informal interpretations, governs
a wide swath of administrative rulings, ranging from advisory opinions to
ruling letters to interpretative guidance. The Mead court held that courts
should defer strongly to formal interpretations under the very deferential
standard set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. ,4 but should be less deferential to informal interpretations by using the
standard articulated in Skidmore.
Chevron is by far the most cited Supreme Court case of the last twenty-five
years and has been the subject of hundreds of law review articles.' Despite its
older pedigree, Skidmore- Chevron's "little brother" - has by contrast gone
1. 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
2. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
3. See infra notes 132-135 and accompanying text. But for a more complicated picture, see infra
notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
4. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
S. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 247 (6th ed.
2006); 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5, at 158 (5th ed. 2010)
(identifying Chevron as one of the most important modem Supreme Court cases and noting
that it has been cited and applied thousands of times); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2075 (199o). But see William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1o83, 1120 (2008)
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understudied.6 As a result, courts and scholars have not come to a consistent
understanding of its doctrine. This lapse is quite significant, since Skidmore
governs the vast majority of interpretative decisions in the modern
administrative state.
7
This Note argues that government agencies should receive substantial
deference when they interpret statutes informally. A key reason why courts
defer to agencies is that agencies are more politically accountable than courts.
Current legal scholarship, however, reflects an outdated view of accountability
that does not reflect more recent insights from political science. While political
scientists previously worried that government bureaucracies were not
responsive to political forces, the current consensus holds that government
agencies are, in fact, quite responsive to the public.
Contemporary legal scholars continue to focus on the extent to which
government officials are accountable via formalistic procedures or alternatively
through direct electoral ties to the populace. However, political scientists now
emphasize that agency officials are actually held accountable through a
multitude of other mechanisms. These mechanisms include extensive oversight
from the elected branches, direct contact with constituents, and interaction
with the media. Thus, as a practical matter, officials are held accountable in
more varied ways than indicated by the current legal literature.
The doctrinal implication of this accountability is that courts should give
meaningful deference to agencies' informal decisions. Courts implementing so-
called "Skidmore deference" often state that agencies receive deference to the
degree their arguments have the "power to persuade.",8 This Note argues that
the legitimate decision of a politically accountable government actor is itself
persuasive. As my epigraph suggests, this treatment is consistent with Justice
Jackson's tone in Skidmore, which suggests substantial "respect" for agency
decisions made "in pursuance of official duty."9 On the other hand, while
deference in the informal context should be substantial, it should still be less
than the very strong deference accorded to formal interpretations. Skidmore
deference should represent an intermediate level between strong deference and
none at all.
6. See Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of
Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1105, 1110 (2OOl) ("[H]istorically courts and scholars have
paid scant attention to what Skidmore deference means. Few law review articles address the
topic.").
7. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. CT. REV.
201, 202-03.
8. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
9. Id. at 139.
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Recent empirical work shows that courts operate inconsistently when
implementing Skidmore. Some court decisions do give substantial deference
under Skidmore, but others do not. These latter courts give agencies deference
only to the degree that the agency demonstrates particular expertise in the
substantive context in question. This Note argues that such cases were wrongly
decided, given the modern understanding of agency accountability.
Furthermore, I provide a novel justification for a set of cases previously
unexplained by scholars. These cases are those in which courts have deferred to
agencies without reference to contextual factors such as expertise. Such
deference is justified by the political accountability of the agencies.
Courts' inconsistent treatment of the Skidmore standard suggests they
would benefit from a coherent model for the treatment of informal agency
interpretations. This Note offers such a model. The model is familiar: courts
can analogize agency statutory interpretation to "persuasive precedent," the
nonbinding decisions of other circuits. Since Skidmore deference is based on the
"power to persuade," looking to persuasive precedent is a natural fit. More
than just linguistic wordplay, however, the persuasive precedent model makes
sense for Skidmore deference. When one court cites the decision of another, it
does so to indicate that another legitimate government body has made a
decision worthy of respect. The political accountability of government agencies
justifies giving them similar respect.
Finally, this model of deference is consistent with recent Supreme Court
precedent. The Court has repeatedly cited political accountability as a
foundational rationale for deferring to government agencies in all contexts.
Furthermore, in recent decisions, the Court has given agencies substantial
deference in the informal Skidmore context. However, like the circuit courts,
the Supreme Court has shown inconsistency when invoking Skidmore. In
particular, the Court has purported to give Skidmore deference in some
situations in which it gave no deference at all. While justified in giving no
deference in these cases, these decisions should not, I argue, have cited
Skidmore, which represents an intermediate level between strong Chevron
deference and no deference at all.
Part I of this Note makes the argument for giving deference to informal
agency decisions on the basis of political accountability. Part II then frames this
line of reasoning within an overview of the judicial doctrine of deference to
agency interpretations of statutes. Part III applies the argument for substantial
Skidmore deference to the actual practice of courts reviewing agency decisions.
The Note concludes with a summary of its argument: because agencies are
politically accountable when acting informally, courts should give substantial
deference to informal interpretations of statutes.
2100
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I. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INFORMAL AGENCY ACTION
Informal agency decisions deserve substantial deference from courts
because agency officials are politically accountable even when acting
informally. Modern political science reveals that politics impacts government
agencies generally. Informal agency decisions are not made by Kafkaesque
bureaucrats tucked away in some distant customs office, and political
accountability is not cabined exclusively within notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Rather, those affected by agency decisions put pressure on
agencies-either directly or indirectly through sympathetic political actors in
the White House or on Capitol Hill.
Agency policies, to borrow the phrase from Skidmore, "are made in
pursuance of official duty,""0 and are therefore subject to significant oversight
by political officials in both the executive and legislative branches.
Furthermore, beyond such oversight, the public itself frequently interacts
directly, both formally and informally, with agencies. This direct interaction
provides an additional layer of oversight and accountability to agency
decisions. Since the agency bureaucrat knows his decision is ultimately
reviewable by political actors, he has an incentive to listen to the public before,
during, and after making decisions.
A. What Accountability Means
Political accountability is clearly an important foundational principle in a
democracy and is a key source of legitimacy for government action. That being
said, the notion is notoriously slippery." My argument uses accountability as
Justice Stevens did in Chevron, namely as responsibility to balance the
competing political forces at work in society."' The Chevron opinion thus
repeatedly mentions "a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing
interests," "reconcil[ing] competing political interests," and "resolving the
10. Id.
ii. One of the many political scientists who has contributed to the voluminous literature on
accountability has called it "the ultimate 'moving target.'" Kevin P. Kearns, The Strategic
Management of Accountability in Nonprofit Organizations: An Analytical Framework, 54 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 185, 187 (1994).
12. See Richard Mulgan, 'Accountability': An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78 PUB. ADMIN. 555, 559
(2000) (describing "the democratic imperative for government organizations to respond to
demands from politicians and the wider public").
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competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve,
or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency."' 3
When legal scholars refer to political accountability, however, they typically
do so in a relatively narrow sense. These authors rely on a view of political
accountability focusing on ties to the elected branches of government-what
political scientist David Mayhew famously deemed "the electoral connection."'
4
The traditional understanding of accountability within the legal literature is
thus the "transmission belt" model, in which accountability flows from the
elected representatives to those appointed-and able to be fired-by them."
This unduly cramped conception of accountability overlooks the myriad of
ways in which everyday government officials are accountable to the public.
For example, in a thoughtful article, David Barron and Elena Kagan stress
the importance of political accountability as a rationale for deference to
agencies. In attacking the formalism of recent legal reasoning, Barron and
Kagan criticize the "ostensible virtues" of notice-and-comment rulemaking,
which "often functions as a charade."' 6 But as a substitute for this procedural
formalism, Barron and Kagan employ a quite narrow view of accountability
based on direct electoral ties to the public. They thus argue that only decisions
made by top-ranking political appointees should receive deference, because
"[i]t is only the presence of high-level agency officials that makes plausible
Chevron's claimed connection between agencies and the public.' 7 1 will show,
on the contrary, that everyday government officials are actually quite connected
and responsive to the public-both directly and indirectly through the
influence of the media and Congress.
Susan Rose-Ackerman has distinguished between two types of
accountability important in democracies: policymaking accountability and
performance accountability. 8  Policymaking accountability requires that
policies themselves accurately reflect societal demands for governmental action
13. 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
14. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed. 2004)
(arguing that a wide variety of activities performed by Congress are driven primarily by
electoral considerations).
15. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (explaining the presidential context); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAv. L. REv. 1667, 1675 (1975)
(explaining the congressional context).
16. Barron & Kagan, supra note 7, at 231.
17. Id. at 242.
is. SUSAN ROsE-AcKeRmAN, FROM ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY: BUILDING ACCOUNTABLE
GOVERNMENT IN HUNGARY AND POLAND 5-6 (2005).
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and provision of resources.19 Performance accountability, by contrast, indicates
that the government is effectively implementing whatever policy choices have
previously been made."
My use of accountability-and, I would argue, the Court's own language in
Chevron and other cases - corresponds to Rose-Ackerman's "policy-making
accountability." What emerges from the political science research described
below is that government bureaucrats routinely balance political forces, even
when making very informal decisions, at all levels of government. On the other
hand, informal decisionmaking arguably does less well by the "performance
accountability" metric in that most of its operation occurs behind the scenes,
ordinarily out of view of the everyday public. This is one reason why Skidmore
deference, while substantial, should be less than Chevron deference.
Of course, to say that government bureaucrats engage in a deliberative
process with constituent groups within a broader context of political pressures
is not to explain why they do so. Unlike politicians, who are obviously
accountable to their constituents through elections, bureaucratic incentives for
accountability are both more varied and more opaque.
Government officials are, as detailed below, affected by a host of political
factors beyond the direct influence of hierarchically superior elected officials.
As Jerry Mashaw explains, "[s]uperiors seldom 'command' their subordinates
in any straightforward way.... Hierarchies turn out to be, not pyramids, but
dense networks." 2 Bureaucrats routinely respond to a diverse range of other
political forces. Direct interaction with constituent groups, congressional
oversight, pressure from the White House, the media- all these actors make
their voices heard, and loudly.
Bureaucrats face real consequences for ignoring these forces. As one
political scientist writes, in an account that will be familiar to anyone who has
worked in a federal agency: " [T]he people being held accountable ... have a
very clear picture of what being held accountable means to them-to them
personally. They recognize that, if someone is holding them accountable...
when they screw up, all hell can break loose." 2 Indeed, even civil servants
neither appointed by elected representatives nor removable for political reasons
19. Id. at 6 (referring to "institutions that channel and manage public participation by
individuals and groups in policy making").
20. Id. at 5.
21. Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of
Governance, in PUBLIC AccouNTABiLrrY: DESIGNS, DLEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 124
(Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006).
22. ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOcRATIc ACCouNTABILITY 3 (2OO1).
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are, in a quite real sense, politically accountable in that they have systematic
incentives to respond to political forces."
B. A New Consensus on Accountability
Scholarship on bureaucracy has changed dramatically over the past several
decades. Legal doctrine, however, has not sufficiently shifted to incorporate
this change. From the 1950s until well into the 198os, bureaucracy was a dirty
word. Both scholarship and popular sentiment portrayed government agencies
as out of touch and out of control-the opposite of politically accountable.4
Politically, Ronald Reagan, in particular, marked perhaps the high water mark
of a harsh attitude toward the bureaucracy. One typical comment was that
"every once in a while, somebody has to get the bureaucracy by the neck and
shake it loose and say, stop what you're doing."2 Recent scholarship has traced
this common complaint through the administrations of Presidents Truman,
Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter.6
Until fairly recently, legal and political science writings mirrored this view
of the political accountability of government agencies. 7 Scholars explicitly
argued that the lack of agency accountability made it problematic to give
discretion to agencies to interpret statutes. As one seminal article stated,
"[i]nsofar as statutes do not effectively dictate agency actions, individual
autonomy is vulnerable to the imposition of sanctions at the unruled will of
executive officials, [and] major questions of social and economic policy are
determined by officials who are not formally accountable to the
electorate .... ,,28 More generally, prominent academics -including Justice
Breyer-have made careers out of suggesting ways to improve a bureaucratic
23. Cf. Laurence H. Silberman, Foreword, Chevron- The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 821, 823 (199o) ("The agencies-even the independent ones-have superior
political standing to the life-tenured federal judiciary in performing that policy making
function.").
24. See MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 4-5 (2000) ("[O]ver time, both scholars and
presidents came to hold the view that bureaucrats exercised discretion in ways that
undermined the goals and directives of their elected superior in the White House.").
25. Id. at 5.
26. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2272-73 (2001).
27. See, e.g., WuIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971).
28. Stewart, supra note 15, at 1676.
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structure portrayed as lethargic or even irrational.29 And at least one leading
scholar attributed the strongly critical view of courts toward agency action
during this period to a similar "loss of faith in agencies."3"
In the last twenty-five years, however, the academic consensus about the
lack of political accountability in government agencies has eroded beyond
recognition. We now understand that federal government agencies are
vigorously overseen both by Congress and the executive branch, and are
directly accountable both to constituent groups and to political forces such as
the media. One political science article described the change as a "veritable
revolution" in scholarly perceptions of bureaucracies.31 A classic example is the
1984 article by Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, analyzing
congressional oversight mechanisms. 2  Though previous scholars had
bemoaned Congress's failure to adequately oversee the executive branch,
McCubbins and Schwartz suggested that congressional oversight was actually
robust. What had appeared to other scholars to be neglect, the authors
maintained, actually reflected "a preference for one form of oversight over
another, less-effective form."33 Congress actually holds administrative agencies
quite accountable via a decentralized system of responding to complaints from
constituent groups and the media. 4
Many other works have detailed the numerous ways by which Congress
oversees agency action.3" Furthermore, in addition to the congressional
literature, many scholars have argued that the President and other White
House staff have greater control over the executive bureaucracy than previously
29. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOwARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993); JAMES QWILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do
AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989).
3o. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1039,
1047 (1997).
31. Richard W. Waterman, Amelia Rouse & Robert Wright, The Venues of Influence: A New
Theory of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 13, 14 (1998).
32. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
3. Id. at 165.
34. See id. at 166.
35. See, e.g., JOEL D. ABERBACH, ROBERT D. PUTNAM & BERT A. ROCKMAN, BUREAUCRATS AND
POLITICIANS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (1981); WILLIAM F. WEST, CONTROLLING THE
BUREAUCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 170-71 (1995); Jack
M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 61 (2oo6); Richard J.
Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos
Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 208-
10 (1991).
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understood, including over independent agencies. 6 Since then, an ongoing
debate has raged (and continues to this day) about which form of oversight is
most legitimate or predominates over the others.37 This change in the
scholarship may also reflect a real change in the realities of bureaucratic
administration. Elena Kagan maintains that presidential control over the
bureaucracy has "expanded dramatically" in the last two decades, "jolt[ing]
into action bureaucrats suffering from bureaucratic inertia.", 8 Thus, as sporadic
as the oversight may seem to the casual observer, agency officials are widely
constrained in their decisionmaking by very real political pressure.
Viewed from the contemporary perspective, there are three striking features
of the political science literature. The first is that scholars saw their work as a
deliberate, purposeful break with the mistaken views of the past. McCubbins
and Schwartz described congressional oversight as "overlooked," arguing that
scholars who have interpreted congressional behavior as "a neglect of
oversight"39 had misinterpreted legislative activity. Another wrote that
"[s]cholars have probably always tended to underestimate the legislature's
interest in and influence over policy implementation ... ,"40 This work is thus
not a mere refinement or revision of the previous view; it is a clear overturning
of the old consensus in the academic community.
The second striking feature of this scholarship is how pervasive the current
scholarly consensus is that government agencies are politically accountable. An
article in the American Journal of Political Science concluded that "few political
scientists still believe that bureaucracy is a lumbering, static entity oblivious to
external control. '41 In the words of another political scientist, "Over a hundred
published empirical studies of bureaucracy in the past two decades have
demonstrated that bureaucratic outputs of many agencies are responsive to the
political principals that oversee their activities. 42
Finally and most importantly, the third feature is the degree to which we
now understand government agencies to be politically accountable. If the old
36. See Kagan, supra note 26; Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential
Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 221 (1982).
37. Compare Kagan, supra note 26 (arguing for "presidential administration"), with Beermann,
supra note 35 (defending "congressional administration").
38. Kagan, supra note 26, at 2249; see also id. at 2317.
39. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 32, at 165.
40. WEST, supra note 35, at 139.
41. B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation, 37
AM. J. POL. SO. 497, 497 (1993).
42. Mihriye Mete, Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments: Politicians, Taxpayers, and the
IRS, 64 J. POL. 384, 384 (2002).
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view was that agencies were completely unaccountable, the new view reflects
the polar opposite conclusion. One researcher studying the Environmental
Protection Agency commented that the "amount and character of congressional
oversight of EPA are both remarkable."43 Another recent commentator refers to
the "plethora of oversight mechanisms," including "scrutin[y] by the Office of
Management and Budget" and "review by Congress."I
The overwhelming conclusion to be taken from this literature is that
government agencies are, in fact, quite politically accountable, through a
variety of oversight mechanisms. It should be no surprise, then, that agencies
are highly responsive to political forces. One early study of the FTC, for
example, found a close correspondence between the policies at the FTC and the
changing political preferences of its congressional oversight committee.4" More
extensive later research found a high degree of political responsiveness, both to
Congress and to the President, in each of six different agencies examined-the
FTC, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, FDA, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), and Office of Surface Mining (OSM). 46 This
dramatic change in our understanding of how government agencies operate
should be reflected in courts' treatment of agency action.
C. Informal Political Accountability
What has been overlooked by current legal scholarship is that politics
permeates government agencies generally, affecting informal as well as formal
decisions. Because they are ultimately accountable to political actors, American
bureaucrats have an incentive to listen to constituent groups about decisions of
all kinds. As a prominent team of social scientists have written, "American
bureaucrats, to a degree unmatched elsewhere, are responsible for shoring up
their own bases of political support. '47 Indeed, far from seeing themselves as
43. Lazarus, supra note 35, at 2o6.
44. Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review ofAgency Rules, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1059, 1059 (2001).
45. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
46. See B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 8Ol (1991).
47. ABERBACH ET AL., supra note 35, at 95.
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rulers of independent fiefdoms, American bureaucrats view their role generally
to be no different from other political actors. 48
An anecdote from the Clinton administration provides an instructive
example of how political input from constituent groups affects informal
decisions by agencies. In 1992, the Nissan Motor Corporation applied to the
Department of Commerce for the approval of a "foreign trade zone" for a
newly expanded car assembly plant in Tennessee, the biggest of its kind in the
United States. Classification as a foreign trade zone would allow imported auto
parts to be taxed at a substantially lower rate and would also allow Nissan to
defer the taxes temporarily.49 Though foreign trade zones are approved by civil
servants at the Commerce Department as a matter of routine and Commerce
staff was close to approving this application, the Big Three American
automakers brought political pressure to bear and held up the decision. 0
Executives from General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler objected to the request,
and these objections caught the attention of U.S. Trade Representative Mickey
Kantor, who worried that the decision would inhibit political support from the
Big Three for President Clinton's economic plan."1 Kantor thus protested to
Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown and Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen.
Only after Vice President Al Gore, the former senator from Tennessee,
intervened and a compromise was forged between various political officials did
the decision go forward. 2
This narrative, though anecdotal, has implications for deference to agency
decisions. Indeed, notice how similar this decision by Commerce officials,
about how to classify a particular item of foreign trade for the purposes of
taxation, is to the decision in question in Mead, the key case in the Court's
modern Skidmore doctrine."3 A court reviewing the bureaucrat's interpretation
of the statute in question could very easily misunderstand the nature of the
decision. After all, the decision would not typically be political, as applications
are "routinely approved by civil servants at the Commerce Department with
little political involvement."" This reasoning, however, would be mistaken,
48. Id. at 95-96.
49. Keith Bradsher, Trade Policy Test at Nissan's Tennessee Plant, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1993, at
Di; see also Douglas Harbrecht & James B. Treece, Tread Marks on Detroit, Bus. WK., May
31, 1993, at 30.
50. Bradsher, supra note 49.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53- See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
s4. Bradsher, supra note 49.
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because it fails to recognize the thick political environment in which
bureaucrats make decisions. It is true that, in the typical case, a decision of this
kind would be made with little political input or process. However, the key
insight from McCubbins and Schwartz is that occasional oversight is legitimate
oversight. Though politics is not involved in every decision, decisions with
important political consequences get political attention. Thus, even a seemingly
routine decision made "informally" by an agency bureaucrat has some political
legitimacy. Indeed, the deliberations within the Clinton Administration were
precisely the "resolving [of] competing interests" referred to by Justice Stevens
in Chevron that should be "entitled to deference.""5
This example involves political accountability via the informal intervention
of White House officials, but Congress provides similar oversight as well.
More formal mechanisms of congressional oversight, such as hearings and
budgeting, are only the most visible aspect of congressional supervision. In
reality, much of Congress's oversight occurs informally. Congressional staffers
themselves deem informal communication with agency personnel their most
effective and frequently used oversight technique.s6 Members of Congress and
staff are in regular communication with agency officials "through telephone
conversations, private meetings, and other off-the-record contacts. '
Agency bureaucrats, as noted, also respond directly to informal political
forces. These forces include the input of constituent groups as well as the news
media. One study has found that American bureaucracy is more sensitive to
media attention than to congressional oversight.s Anecdotal evidence confirms
that bureaucrats are highly responsive to the prospect of future media
attention. For instance, one study of the Food and Drug Administration found
that "FDA operators define their jobs" in accordance with "their overriding fear
... [of] the scandal that would occur if they approved a new drug that later
caused death or injury.""9 As with congressional oversight, media attention is
haphazard and episodic, but still a powerful and indeed constant influence over
s. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
56. JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
130-37 (1990).
57. WEST, supra note 35, at 132.
58. Wood & Waterman, supra note 41, at 524; see also BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT
BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 78-80 (1982) (describing how the media hold government
agencies accountable). But see SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE
LAW: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 117 (1996) ("[Wie did not find that the media
exerted influence over EPA activity... ").
59. WILSON, supra note 29, at 8o-8i; see also Paul J. Quirk, Food and Drug Administration, in THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION 191, 217 (James Q. Wilson ed., 198o).
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agency behavior. Bureaucrats consider how a particular decision will "look"
before proceeding, even though they know that the chances of any individual
action garnering media attention are small. 6' And the mistakes that are
publicized both provoke systematic change and serve as a warning to other
agencies.
Constituent groups wielding the force of the media can also have a
powerful effect on all aspects of agency decisionmaking. For example, in the
wake of Ralph Nader's 19 65 bestseller Unsafe at Any Speed, Nader developed an
influential relationship with NHTSA. Originally, Nader's influence on the
agency came indirectly through his clout with the Senate Commerce
Committee. In time, Nader's Center for Auto Safety became simply "an
intermediary between the agency and disgruntled consumers," as the Center's
staff took letters sent to Nader by the members of the public and forwarded
them directly to "senior regulatory officials, including the secretary of
transportation. '' 62 Clearly, the voice of the public was heard well beyond the
narrow confines of notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Agencies interpreting and implementing statutes nonetheless are often
similarly pressured by those affected by their actions and have incentives to
take that pressure into account when making decisions. A study of the creation
of OSM, for instance, provides a fascinating example of the direct influence of
a diverse array of constituent groups on agency decisionmaking, in the wake of
the Office's 1977 conception to regulate coal mining. 6' The initial rulemaking
process was marked by "rancorous political conflict" as the coal industry and
environmentalists "[e]ach wanted and expected to have a significant part in
shaping the forthcoming regulations" which would dictate the parameters of
the new agency.64
The political input of these groups did not end with the conclusion of
notice and comment, however. To the contrary, the ongoing enforcement
process of inspecting mines and levying fines on offenders was affected by
direct political pressure on the agency by the same groups that participated in
rulemaking. The relative success of this pressure was driven, in part, by the
political relationship between the parties and the current presidential
administration. During the first seven months of inspections (May-December
6o. See Quirk, supra note 59, at 217.
61. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FORAUTO SAFETY 126 (1990).
62. Id.
63. See NEAL SHOVER, DONALD A. CLELLAND & JOHN LYNxwILER, ENFORCEMENT OR
NEGOTIATION: CONSTRUCTING A REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY 37 (1986).
64. Id. at 54; see also id. at 54-71.
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1978), the agency inspected only ten percent of regulated mines, prompting
harsh criticisms from environmentalists, who "carefully examined the agency's
performance of inspections., 6s As a result of the criticism, the agency, under
the Carter Administration, quite literally redoubled its efforts, inspecting
twenty-five percent of mines within the six months.66 The rise led to
complaints from the coal industry, which, in turn, led to the softening of
agency policies in the newly sympathetic Reagan Administration.6 7
The "bigger picture" political science research confirms the lesson of these
anecdotes: bureaucrats are legitimately responsive to political forces through a
wide variety of mechanisms. One study, for example, surveyed more than a
hundred middle management officials at federal agencies. 6' The study found
significant agency responsiveness to interest groups, executive management,
and Congress. 69 The officials reported that interest groups make their voices
heard through informal communication with agency personnel and public
meetings, as well as written comments in the rulemaking process.7 ° Other
research confirms the range of "'direct' and 'diffuse"' influences political forces
have on bureaucrats. 71
Because bureaucrats are politically accountable when making informal
decisions about how to interpret statutes, courts should not pretend that
rulemaking carries with it political legitimacy altogether different from other
agency decisions. Indeed, the groups interacting with agencies informally are
often the same ones who participated in notice-and-comment rulemaking or
even lobbied Congress for (or against) the statute granting the agency
regulatory authority in the first place.72 It may still be necessary for a court to
step in and overrule an agency when it has, in fact, stretched the language of its
statute too far. But courts should be sensitive to the fact that agency decisions,
as a result of the political processes behind them, have some initial authority
and legitimacy.
65. Id. at 81.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 8o-81.
68. Scott R. Furlong, Political Influence on the Bureaucracy: The Bureaucracy Speaks, 8 J. PuB.
ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 39, 45 (1998).
69. Id. at 47-48.
70. Id. at 54-56; see also Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in
Rule Making: A Decade of Change, IS J. PuB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 353, 365 (2005)
(describing effectiveness of informal communication).
71. See Waterman et al., supra note 31, at 35-36.
72. SHOVER ET AL., supra note 63, at 54 ("Now, the bitter legislative adversaries turned their
attention to the Office of Surface Mining and its rule-making process.").
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Of course, one may question whether these political forces are a desirable
feature in a functioning democracy. Scholars have long worried about agency
"capture" - that government agencies will become more responsive to well-
organized interest groups with a stake in their decisions than to the diffuse
public whose interests the agencies were created to serve. r3 Prominent scholars
have cited agency capture specifically as a reason to worry about delegating
lawmaking authority to agencies.74
There is reason to believe, though, that these fears are overblown.
Substantial doubts have been raised about whether the influence of "special
interest" groups really has such pernicious effects on agencies. The "agency
capture" view has been under attack for some time. Indeed, one well-known
political scientist noted as early as the mid-198os that "no version of the
capture theory is universally accepted, and it is increasingly under attack by
those who dispute both the pervasiveness of the capture phenomenon and its
proffered explanations. ' 75 Recent scholarship has emphasized that past
theorists overestimated the degree to which "concentrated special interests"
really get their way at the expense of the populace. 76 These arguments have
been made primarily by political scientists, though, and seem not to have
permeated the legal discourse.
My task here, however, is not to wade into the debate about delegation to
agencies. My thesis is not about the original decision to delegate to agencies,
but rather that fears about agency capture are not especially salient in the
context of delegated decisions made informally. The political forces at work in
informal agency decisionmaking are more or less the same as those working
elsewhere in the administrative and legislative process.
73. See Kagan, supra note 26, at 2264-65. For classic explications of "capture theory," see
generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads,
and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); and George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
74. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 63-67 (1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 321 (2000).
75. Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1094, 1094 (1985).
76. Donald Wittman, The End of Special Interests Theory and the Beginning of a More Positive View
of Democratic Politics, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF
REGULATION 193, 193 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010); see also Daniel
Carpenter, Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?, in GOVERNMENT AND
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION, supra, at 164; Marissa Martino Golden,
Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J.
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Finally, it should be noted that the political process by which Congress
itself operates is subject to the same concerns about democratic legitimacy as
informal agency decisionmaking. Justice Breyer has pointed out the similarities
between Congress's lawmaking process and the operations of an administrative
bureaucracy, arguing in favor of the legitimacy of both.' In fact, since much of
the informal influence on agencies comes directly from Congress, the political
forces affecting agencies may be quite literally the same as the forces affecting
Congress. One well-known scholar has thus argued that the "deviation
between agency action" and the actual enactments of Congress "is not that
great. 8 Indeed, Jerry Mashaw has taken this argument one step further,
arguing that delegation to bureaucracies actually provides more political
accountability than direct action by Congress itself.79 The political process of
Congress is, for all of its faults, treated as having authority, and informal
agency decisions should similarly be treated with some respect.
D. Political Accountability and Formal Procedures
As a theoretical matter, a key virtue of notice-and-comment rulemaking is
that all parties have an equal chance to submit comments and have the agency
respond to them, either by changing the regulation or giving a
counterarguments °  Informal political processes, by this logic, may
disadvantage relatively disorganized or powerless groups."' This would suggest
that the process of notice-and-comment is a better guarantee of political input
than the informal mechanisms I have described.82
While there is some truth to this theoretical analysis, in reality it both
overstates the extent to which formal processes are democratic and undersells
the political legitimacy of informal action. Though in theory practices like
notice-and-comment rulemaking put all affected parties on an equal playing
field, as a practical matter this is far from the truth. For one thing, well-
organized interest groups, who are able to monitor the Federal Register for the
77. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REv. 845, 858-60 (1992).
78. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 2027, 2128
(2002).
7g. See Mashaw, supra note i5, at 95-99.
8o. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAvis, ADMINISTRATwE LAw TREATISE § 6:38 (2d ed. 1978)
("Rulemaking procedure allows the agency to consult any and all who are interested . .
81. See infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
82. See Kagan, supra note 26, at 2264-65.
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publication of upcoming rules and are able to hire experienced lawyers to
participate effectively in the notice-and-comment process, will have systematic
advantages over the disorganized public or relatively less powerful groups in
rulemaking.8 3 The advantages of well-heeled or organized groups in the
rulemaking process are similar to the advantages these groups will have in
informal processes.
Additionally, while the process of notice and comment theoretically treats
the comments made by actors of all stripes equally, in reality agency staff is not
blind to the source of each comment. Agencies may take different comments
more or less seriously, depending on the political power of the commenter.8 4 A
member of the public who is more likely to sue or pursue "behind the scenes"
political channels may receive more changes than a less well-connected
commenter. Indeed, studies conducted by political scientists have found
precisely this result.8s
Furthermore, as those with experience with the process have observed,
notice-and-comment rulemaking is typically not where the political process
works itself out in agency decisions. Rather, even in formal rulemaking
contexts, public participation happens more significantly by "informal" means.
As Professor Donald Elliott, a former General Counsel of the EPA, explains:
No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-
comment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining
input from interested parties. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to
public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions- a
highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of
something which in real life takes place in other venues. To secure the
genuine reality, rather than a formal show, of public participation, a
variety of techniques is available -from informal meetings with trade
83. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND
MAKE POLICY 111 (2d ed. 1999); Katharine . Seeyle, Flooded with Comments, Officials Plug
Their Ears, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 2002, at C4 (noting "AstroTurf campaigns" by well-
organized advocacy groups in the rulemaking process).
84. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 16 (1982)
("The agency virtually always retains a broad range of discretion, the exercise of which
involves inherently political choices.").
85. See, e.g., Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 92
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 663, 671 (1998) (finding that "the agency was more responsive to
comments submitted by high-income specialties after publication of the Proposed Rule than
to those submitted by low-income specialties").
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associations and other constituency groups, to roundtables, to floating
"trial balloons" in speeches or leaks to the trade press .... 86
As this account makes clear, the political process is not actually working, in any
realistic way, in rulemaking. To the degree that deference is rooted in political
accountability, agencies should not be accorded less deference simply because
they chose not to utilize notice and comment. In either case, the political
process really works itself out informally.
Elena Kagan, who served as deputy director of the Domestic Policy Council
in the Clinton Administration, confirms that notice-and-comment rulemaking
is not actually how political accountability works in government agencies. As
Kagan writes, "the formal (though nominally 'informal') process of notice-
and-comment" has "little to do with genuine exchange between regulators and
interested parties. '' 8' Rather, "prior, informal consultations ... currently serve
as the principal means for government officials to gain information from
interested parties.',1
Kagan buttresses this assertion with two telling anecdotes from her tenure
in the Clinton Administration. The first is President Clinton's decision to
regulate cigarettes using an expansive reading of the authority of the Food and
Drug Administration-a reading eventually struck down by the Supreme
Court.8 9 Clinton announced the decision prior to the commencement of
rulemaking, laying out, in detail, how the agency would regulate tobacco. 90
Though the agency then proceeded with the notice-and-comment process, this
process was largely irrelevant. 9 ' Similarly, the rulemaking process played little
if any role in the Department of Labor's action to allow states to offer paid
leave to new parents through the unemployment insurance system. 92 Kagan
argues persuasively that these decisions were supported by a substantial
amount of political accountability, as President Clinton himself took public
responsibility for the proposals. 93 However, to accord these rulemaking
proceedings particular deference because the government utilized notice and
86. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DuKE L.J. 1490,1492-93 (1992).
$7. Kagan, supra note 26, at 2360.
8S. Id.
89. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
go. Kagan, supra note 26, at 2282-83.
91. See id. at 2283, 2301.
92. See id. at 2284.
93. See id. at 2331-39.
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comment would simply not reflect the reality of the minimal role the process
actually had in the decisions.
The political science research confirms these anecdotal accounts that
political forces have only minimal effect in notice-and-comment rulemaking.
One extensive study of ten instances of agency rulemaking by Marissa Golden
found only a single instance of the notice-and-comment process producing
significant changes to a rule.94 By contrast, "in the majority of cases the agency
made some of the changes that were requested by commenters, but it rarely
altered the heart of the proposal.""5 Indeed, one significant finding of the study
was that agencies consistently used the notice-and-comment process to justify
previously made policy decisions, rather than taking into account the strength
of forces favoring or disfavoring the proposal. 96
Other research similarly indicates that agencies are politically accountable,
but that the notice-and-comment process is not where this accountability plays
out. A study of forty-two rulemaking proceedings confirmed Golden's findings
that changes made in the comment process "seldom address the fundamental
nature of the policy."97 Notably, this study found that, in the vast majority of
rulemaking proceedings, agency officials consulted informally with
nongovernmental officials in the process of formulating the proposed rule, but
relied on constituent input far less during the formal comment period. 98 Thus,
agency officials' positions may actually rigidify by producing "detailed and
thoroughly justified proposals. " 99
The lesson of this research is not that notice-and-comment rulemaking is
useless. On the contrary, notice and comment serves valuable functions. For
example, the procedure allows agencies to solicit input from a broader range of
voices in the regulatory process, as well as to create an administrative record for
judicial review.' °° Relatedly, the notice-and-comment procedure also promotes
transparency in the regulatory process. Furthermore, notice and comment may
alert agency staff to the existence of factors that, for whatever reason, they were
94. Golden, supra note 76, at 259.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 261-62.
97. William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in
Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 66, 74
(2004).
98. Id. at 70-71.
99. Id. at 74-75.
1oo. See id. at 70, 74-75.
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previously unaware of.1 'O And by allowing outside groups to give input on the
regulatory language prior to its formal enactment, the agency may be made
aware of unintended consequences of its phrasing of the rule, or allow the
agency to clarify ambiguous language.
These advantages of formal rulemaking suggest affording greater deference
to statutory interpretation performed with such procedures. My point is not
that formal rulemaking has no benefits. But the contrast between informal and
formal decisionmaking should also not be overestimated. When it comes to
political accountability, the difference between how formal and informal
decisions get made may be very slight. The large amount of political
accountability buttressing informal decisions warrants significant, albeit lesser,
deference.
E. Related Scholarship
David Barron and Elena Kagan, as noted above,' °2 have argued for the
significance of political accountability in supporting deference to agency
decisions. However, because these authors focus exclusively on electoral ties,
they substantially underestimate the broad accountability of everyday
government officials. It is quite difficult to reconcile Barron and Kagan's
comment that "[c]areer agency staff, as a rule, are (proudly) resistant to broad
political influence"'0 3 with, for example, political science findings that that very
same staffs behavior tracks closely the political preferences of congressional
oversight.0 4 As one political scientist starkly concluded in a study on the
subject, "the career civil service is . . . at least at the upper levels of the civil
service -considerably more responsive than resistant" to political forces.' 5
In fact, Barron and Kagan themselves give various examples of officials
being held accountable through informal political mechanisms. Because these
instances have no connection to elections, however, Barron and Kagan fail to
recognize them as examples of real political accountability. The authors recount
instances in both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations of low-
level government officials making informal decisions that generate a large
degree of political backlash. , 6 As the authors note, in each case the relevant
lol. See id. at 71-72.
102. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
103. Barron & Kagan, supra note 7, at 242.
104. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
loS. GOLDEN, supra note 24, at 13.
106. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 7, at 253-54 & n.18o.
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department secretary endured "a firestorm of protest from individuals,
companies, members of Congress, and even the White House" - and, as a
result, reversed the decision. 1°7 These are examples of the process working
through informal political mechanisms, not failing to work; the political
backlash completely changed the original decision. Yet Barron and Kagan cite
them as examples of the problem, complaining that "[n]o resignation took
place. ' ' That reflects a metric of political accountability that is too narrow.
Similarly, in a recent insightful article on congressional oversight of the
executive, Jack Beermann argues that political accountability resulting from
congressional oversight justifies deference to agency decisions.10 9 Beermann's
account is congruent with my own to the extent that he recognizes that
government agencies are broadly political accountable."' However, Beermann
disputes the degree to which agency officials are accountable in the informal
context. He thus argues against deference in those circumstances.
Beermann attacks accountability in the informal context based on a claim
about publicity. Beermann reasons that without notice-and-comment
rulemaking, "the lack of public proceedings makes it less likely that substantial
communication between members of Congress and agency officials took
place."11. This statement misjudges informal political accountability for three
reasons. First, even if the informal mechanisms sometimes operate behind the
scenes, they still represent a viable and legitimate political process. Second,
groups.and individuals affected by agency action have a natural incentive to
make the matter public-either by bringing it to the attention of political
representatives or by alerting the media. Third, an exclusive focus on Congress
misses a variety of ways in which agencies are held accountable, both before
and after the fact.
Beermann's point about public proceedings having some value is well
taken. Skidmore deference should be less than Chevron precisely because of the
public guarantees of notice and comment. 2 Yet Beermann is mistaken if he
believes that the lack of notice and comment makes the process behind
informal decisions inherently illegitimate. The Nissan anecdote described
above is instructive in this regard. 13 Though the machinations of the Clinton
107. Id.
io8. Id. at 254.
iog. Beermann, supra note 35, at 153-54.
110. See id. at 157.
iii. Id. at 153; see also id. at 152.
ii. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text; supra notes 1OO-1O and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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administration were behind the scenes, the agency decision was still clearly the
product of a viable political process. Indeed, it is precisely this type of behind-
the-scenes wrangling that is the hallmark of congressional dealmaking. In
administrative agencies as well as the legislature, what is public is only a
shadow of the real interests at stake.
Additionally, Beermann's account understates the degree to which informal
agency proceedings will, as a practical matter, become public. As the empirical
accounts indicate, notice-and-comment rulemaking is not actually how public
debate about an issue occurs. Even in formal rulemaking proceedings, the
public learns about agency decisions by presidential press conferences and
agency news releases, not by scanning the Federal Register. And in the
informal context, parties affected by agency decisions have proven themselves
quite capable of drawing attention to the proceedings -either by calling their
congressional representatives (or contacts at the White House) or by alerting
the press. It is hardly the case that consequential decisions made by federal
government agencies go without notice.
Finally, by focusing solely on actual congressional oversight, Beermann
misses the wide variety of ways in which agency officials are otherwise held
accountable. For one thing, Beermann's emphasis on Congress overemphasizes
the importance of this after-the-fact means of control. Even more important
than the actual action of Congress is the anticipation, or threat, of possible
action. Bureaucrats live with the idea of Congress watching over their shoulder.
Like accountability mechanisms in many domains, it is not so much the limited
actual punishment as the broader, constant threat of action that creates
incentives to behave in a particular way. Furthermore, Beermann probably
understates the degree to which agency officials respond not only to Congress
but also to White House officials and the press. The potential for future media
attention is arguably the most important means of accountability, and
Beermann's account neglects it.
Ultimately, it is not clear whether Professor Beermann believes the lack of
publicity completely undermines the political accountability rationale for
Skidmore deference. He might, alternatively, be amenable to the argument
presented here that Skidmore deference should be substantial, but less than
Chevron. Without an explicit statement in this regard, it is difficult to say. But
his attack on informal agency accountability is unwarranted.
Einer Elhauge, in his work on "preference-estimating default rules," has
also defended deference to agencies under Chevron on the basis of the political
legitimacy of agencies.114 However, Elhauge explicitly challenges my notion
114. See Elhauge, supra note 78, at 2126-29, 2135-37.
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that political accountability supports deference in the informal context.
Elhauge's key claim is that "it is only rulemaking that is conducted after notice
and comment that gives some reasonable assurance that the agency surveyed
the current political preferences before acting." ' Elhauge's reasoning in
support of this claim centers around notice-that notice and comment "alerts
congressional members and the President's political advisors that an issue is
coming up that they may be interested in influencing, or at least alerts private
parties who then alert these political officials.""' 6
As a realistic matter, though, notice and comment does not actually play
nearly the role Elhauge describes within government agencies. As the Kagan
and Elliott accounts both make clear, notice and comment is not how
government agencies assess current political preferences. Interested groups
often do not learn about agency action in the Federal Register. Rather, they
monitor agencies for conduct which affects them. Likewise, as Elhauge himself
seems to acknowledge, it is not through comment but by exerting political
pressure informally that interested groups make their voices heard.1 7 The
"Kabuki theater" of notice and comment cannot bear the weight that Elhauge
puts on it.
II. WHY, WHEN, AND HOW MUCH DEFERENCE
Recent political science research has thus made clear that government
agencies are quite responsive to political forces of all kinds. Political
accountability was one of the principal justifications for Chevron, and it should
not be abandoned in the Skidmore context. It is true that informal decisions lack
the guaranteed quasi-political input from constituent groups that is the
hallmark of notice-and-comment rulemaking governed by Chevron. Still, the
research makes clear that political forces do hold sway in the informal context.
These forces should not count for nothing in the courts.
A. Justifications for Deference
The Supreme Court has long held that courts should defer to some degree
to an agency's own interpretation of the statutes it implements. The Court has
cited three primary reasons for deferring to agency interpretative decisions.
115. Id. at 2140.
ii6. Id.
117. See also Seeyle, supra note 83 ("[T]he public comment period has become a widely
discredited measure of public sentiment ... ").
2120
119:2096 2010
ACCOUNTABILITY, DEFERENCE, AND THE SKIDMORE DOCTRINE
The first, and most traditional, reason for deferring to agency interpretations is
expertise." 8 This reason has been cited by the Court in various decisions over
many years, with the basic rationale being that the agency officials who
implement and administer statutes on a consistent basis have more expertise to
interpret the statute's meaning than courts. " 9
The second reason for affording deference to agency interpretations of
statutes is that Congress has delegated lawmaking authority to the agency
under the statute in question. This reason was part of the justification for
Chevron, 2' and the Court reiterated its significance in Mead.' As Justice
Souter wrote for the Court, "We hold that administrative implementation of a
particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."" The Court confirmed the
implied delegation rationale as recently as 2006.13
The third and final reason cited by the Court for agency deference is
political accountability. This reason was at the heart of Chevron. Justice
Stevens, writing for the unanimous Court, relied heavily on this factor, in a
discussion worth quoting at length:
[P]olicy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or
administrators, not to judges. . . . [I]t is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices-
resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the
118. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the
Misplaced Legacy ofSkidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 735, 739 (2002).
119. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 720 (1948) ("The kind of specialized knowledge
Congress wanted its agency to have was an expertness that would fit it to stop at the
threshold every unfair trade practice.... ."); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947)
(emphasizing that administrative determinations are entitled to the most deference when
they are the product of "administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the
problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested
facts").
120. 467 U.S. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation.").
121. 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
122. Id.
123. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006).
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agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of
everyday realities .. .. In such a case, federal judges-who have no
constituency- have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do."
While this statement came from liberal icon Justice Stevens, its core message is
one also held dear by modern judicial conservatives: the elected branches, and
not judges, should make policy. The courts have routinely invoked this core
rationale for deferring to agencies in the quarter-century since Chevron.' The
central project of this Note is to show that the rationale of political
accountability applies in large degree to informal Skidmore decisions.
In addition to the primary three reasons, a fourth reason for deferring to
agency interpretations is interest representation. The basic idea underlying this
rationale is that groups affected by agency action should be given an
opportunity to make their views heard in the agency's process. If this process
occurs, the agency action takes on legitimacy." 6 This theory overlaps with the
political accountability model in that it involves bringing the input of affected
groups to bear on administrative decisions, but is more formalistic in its
emphasis on allowing each group to "have their say." The Supreme Court has
never cited this rationale for deferring to agencies, but it was cited frequently
by circuit courts in pre-Chevron decisions. 7
B. Domains of Deference: Chevron vs. Skidmore
The Supreme Court has, in recent years, indicated that the amount courts
should defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute has a close relationship
124. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66.
125. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005);
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 5ol U.S. 68o (1991); see also Silberman, supra note 23, at
822 ("Chevron's rule... is simply a sound recognition that a political branch, the executive,
has a greater claim to make policy choices than the judiciary."); Sunstein, supra note 5, at
2087.
126. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 1670 ("Increasingly, the function of administrative law is...
the provision of a surrogate political process to ensure the fair representation of a wide range
of affected interests in the process of administrative decision.").
127. See, e.g., Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 611 (9th Cit. 1984) (claiming that rulemaking
procedure "reintroduces a representative public voice"); Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d
694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 198o) ("Notice and public comment... reintroduce public participation
and fairness to affected parties."); Texaco, Inc. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d
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with the method by which the agency came to the particular interpretation.
The strongest form of deference is associated with the Chevron decision, and its
famous "two step." The first step is determining whether the statute in
question is clear or ambiguous. When the statute is clear, no deference is
necessary, as "courts are bound to follow the clearly expressed intent of
Congress."2 But when the statute is ambiguous, Chevron established that
courts must be very deferential to reasonable interpretations of the statute by
agencies. This deference standard has been referred to by scholars as "strong,
mandatory deference"' 2 9 or "a very broad rule of deference. 1 30
However, the Court has recently limited this strong version of judicial
deference to a certain subset of agency statutory interpretations. In
Christensen3' and Mead,'32 the Court held that agency decisions made by formal
adjudication or utilizing full notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures as
prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act are entitled to full Chevron
deference. Such decisions are "formal" instances of statutory interpretation. On
the other hand, "informal agency interpretations" are governed by a lower level
of deference, associated with Skidmore.133 As the Court stated in Christensen,
"interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are 'entitled to
respect' under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., . . . but only to the
extent that those interpretations have the 'power to persuade.""'  In order to
decide whether to give an agency interpretation Chevron or Skidmore deference,
therefore, the Court must conduct what scholars have called a "Step Zero"
analysis of the formality of the procedures used by the agency in coming to that
decision.13
s
Although this determination about the agency's procedures precedes the
usual Chevron analysis, courts considering informal interpretations under
Skidmore still need to consider whether the statute in question is, in fact,
128. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107
COLUM. L. REv. 1235, 1241-42 (2007).
129. Id. at 1242.
13o. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 5, at 1o86.
131. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
132. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
133. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 5, at io88.
134. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
135. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 912-14
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
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ambiguous., 6 The Supreme Court has recently confirmed this point explicitly,
stating that it has "no need to choose between Skidmore and Chevron" when the
statute in question is clear.'37 Thus, only when a court has found a statute to be
ambiguous does the level of deference matter. When a court makes such a
finding, it then proceeds to Step Two, deciding whether the agency's
interpretation is "reasonable." The Step Zero analysis of formality thus
determines how deferential the court should be in judging the reasonableness
of the agency's interpretation.
It should be noted that this description may somewhat overstate how
precisely the Court has demarcated the boundaries of Chevron and Skidmore
deference. The decision in Mead strongly linked the standard of deference to
the formality of agency procedures: "It is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure. .... 138 Even so, some
members of the Court have objected to the idea that formality exclusively
dictates the degree of deference.'39 In particular, Mead indicated that Congress
might be able to prescribe strong deference to informal action by explicitly
delegating lawmaking authority to informal action. 4' This language has
proven confusing to scholars and lower courts.1 4' Nonetheless, despite the
possibility of exceptions on the margins, scholars agree that formality is the
136. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 128, at 1247 ("[B]ecause a reviewing court will not defer
to an agency under either doctrine if the statute's meaning is clear, the Skidmore standard
implicitly replicates Chevron's first step.").
137. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004).
138. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
139. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]he existence of a formal rulemaking proceeding is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for according Chevron deference to an agency's
interpretation of a statute.").
140. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
141. See William S. Jordan, III, United States v. Mead: Complicating the Delegation Dance, [2001]
31 Envd. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,425, 11,429-30 (discussing the interpretation of Mead
by lower courts); William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory Interpretations:
The Answer Is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 719, 719
(2002) ("First in Christensen v. Harris County, then in United States v. Mead Corp., the Court
created a cumbersome, unworkable regime under which courts must draw increasingly fine
distinctions using impossibly vague standards." (foomotes omitted)); Richard W. Murphy,
Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1038 (2005)
(calling Mead "downright confusing").
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principal factor that determines the level of deference afforded to agency
interpretations. 42
Thus, the Court has laid out a fairly coherent framework for different levels
of deference to agencies' interpretation of ambiguous statutes. For formal
agency decisions, such as formal adjudications or notice-and-comment
rulemaking, courts should be quite deferential to agency interpretations under
the Chevron doctrine. So long as the agency's interpretation of the statute is
reasonable or plausible, the agency's interpretation should not be overruled.
For other, informal agency decisions, however, the Skidmore standard operates
as a default setting of lesser deference.' 43 In other words, "Skidmore is the
backstop doctrine that applies when Chevron deference is unavailing."'" Since
the Skidmore backstop governs the majority of administrative decisions, 4' the
level of deference indicated by that default setting is crucially important.
C. How Much Is Skidmore Deference?
Current scholarship has not come to a consistent view of how deferential
courts are or should be when giving an agency interpretation Skidmore
deference. There is thus a substantial amount of disagreement about the
Skidmore doctrine.4 6 At one end of the spectrum are those who believe that
Skidmore deference is no deference at all-what could be called "zero
deference." This belief is the doctrinal target of this Note. Giving agencies no
deference under Skidmore does not comport with the underlying rationale that
142. See Elhauge, supra note 78, at 2140 ("[The Court] continues to define the rulemaking that
has force of law as 'notice-and-comment rulemaking' and the adjudication that has the force
of law as 'formal' adjudication. True, Mead left open a small residual category illustrated by
one case that involved informal rulemaking, but it made clear that the most significant
factor was the existence of a 'notice-and-comment' procedure." (footnotes omitted)); see also
Barton & Kagan, supra note 7, at 203 ("The Court emphasized most heavily the divide
between formal and informal procedures, suggesting that, except in unusual circumstances,
only decisions taken in formal procedural contexts merit Chevron deference."); Murphy,
supra note 141, at io16 (characterizing the Court's doctrine as indicating that "procedure
should be the presumptive touchstone of strong deference").
143. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 5, at 1092.
144. Elhauge, supra note 78, at 2136 n.358.
145. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
146. See Michael Herz, Judicial Review of Statutory Issues Outside of the Chevron Doctrine, in A
GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 123, 129 (John F. Duffy &
Michael Herz eds., 2005) ("Just how much respect these interpretations merit or in fact
receive is both variable and disputed .... ); Rossi, supra note 6, at 1111; Charles A. Sullivan,
On Vacation, 43 Hous. L. REv. 1143, 1204 n.287 (2006).
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the greater political accountability of agencies justifies deference. Nonetheless,
some courts have improperly interpreted Skidmore as a doctrine of zero
deference.
At the heart of zero deference is the oft-quoted maxim, originating in
Skidmore itself, that the "power to persuade" is the source of Skidmore
deference. The problem with this formulation is that it suggests that the
persuasive force of the argument made by agencies is the sole consideration for
courts.1 47 No weight is given to the fact that the agency is a government entity.
In the words of then-Judge Breyer, "The simple fact that the agency has a
position, in and of itself, is of only marginal significance.' ' 48 The agency's
decision is treated by the court in essentially the same manner as a brief by any
other party in litigation. 49 Under this regime, circumstances in which the
agency has very technical expertise would be perhaps the only instances in
which courts should defer at all."' It is very hard to see how this gives any
content to so-called Skidmore deference.151
My assertion is that the "power to persuade" should not refer merely to the
persuasive force of an agency's argument. An analogy to courts' use of
"persuasive precedent" is instructive. When one court cites the nonbinding
decision of another, it sometimes delves into the reasoning used by the other
court. However, in many instances, one court will cite another court without
even mentioning the reasoning of that other court. In those instances, the court
is citing the other court simply to note that another legitimate government
actor has made a particular decision. In the same way, a statutory
interpretation performed by a federal agency has legitimacy; the fact that the
agency is politically accountable gives its decision authority.152 This was the
deference rationale cited by Justice Stevens in Chevron.
147. For an interpretation of Skidmore deference along these lines, see Jed I. Bergman, Note,
Putting Precedent in Its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 969, 982 n.69 (1996). See also Mayburg v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d
1oo, io6 (1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.) ("[U]nder Skidmore the agency ultimately must depend
upon the persuasive power of its argument.").
148. Mayburg, 740 F.2d at 1o6. According to a former student, Judge Breyer, in his capacity as a
professor at Harvard Law School, used to tell his students that agency decisions should be
afforded roughly the same weight as law review articles.
149. See Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence in Informal
Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REv. 1, 8 (2006).
1so. See Mayburg, 740 F.2d at io6 ("The fact that a question is closely related to an agency's area
of expertise may give an agency greater 'power to persuade."').
151. See Pietruszkiewicz, supra note 149, at 8.
152. See generally supra Part I.
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Of course, it makes sense that, without the guarantees of notice and
comment, courts should give less weight to these political factors in the
informal context.' As current doctrine properly indicates, Skidmore deference
should be less than Chevron deference. But to act as if informal agency
decisions are made in a political vacuum is simply inaccurate, and introduces
needless discontinuity between the two doctrines.
Skidmore deference, then, should be intermediate deference-more than
zero deference to agency interpretations but less than full Chevron deference.'"4
This level of deference has been called "thumb-on-the-scale" deference. s
Political accountability gives agency interpretations a baseline level of
legitimacy prior to consideration of these contextual factors. Nonetheless,
substantial deference and context need not be mutually exclusive. Courts can
give substantial deference to agencies but modify this default when, for
example, the agency happens to have particular technical expertise.
Justice Scalia has been perhaps the most vocal proponent of deference to
administrative decisions.' s6 He dissented sharply in Mead, on the grounds that
agency decisions should receive full Chevron deference even in the informal
context. 157 However, Justice Scalia has also disputed the notion of intermediate
153. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text; supra notes loo-ioi and accompanying text.
154. Of course, explicitly adopting a deference regime with an "intermediate" level between two
extremes invites a comparison to the Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence, in which
"intermediate scrutiny" inhabits a middle ground between "strict" and "rational basis"
scrutiny. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §5 8-3 to -4. The Court
has thus shown its comfort with such a tiered structure. Although a thorough treatment is
beyond the scope of this Note, it is interesting to note the conceptual parallels between a
"deference" regime, in which a court considers overriding the executive with its reading of a
statute, and a "scrutiny" regime, in which a court considers overriding the legislature with
its reading of the Constitution. I thank Haninah Levine for pointing out this comparison to
me. On the other hand, commentators in the "legal realist" tradition have long suggested
that the "tiers of scrutiny" are a judicial contrivance that does little to determine the outcome
of decisions. See David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 293, 308 (1976) (famously calling the test "a label to describe a preordained result").
Perhaps not surprisingly, a similar, though somewhat less severe, claim has recently been
leveled about the Court's deference regime. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 5, at 1o98-11oo
(arguing "that the Court's deference practice functions along a continuum," not the
articulated deference regime, and noting that "a majority of the Court's cases involving an
agency interpretation of a federal statute do not invoke any deference regime").
1s5. Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What Would Justice Stevens
Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1877, 1905 (2006).
156. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511; see also Barron & Kagan, supra note 7, at 205 (noting the "nearly unlimited deference
[Justice Scalia] favors").
157. 533 U.S. at 239-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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deference. At the heart of Justice Scalia's objection is the metaphysical claim
that one cannot defer more or less to someone else. Either one defers or one
does not: "the notion that there are degrees of deference is absurd. . . . 'Some
deference,' or 'less than total deference,' is no deference at all."' s By providing
a familiar model for Skidmore deference - that of persuasive precedent - I hope
to prove unfounded Justice Scalia's worry that "so-called Skidmore deference" is
"indeterminate. "'19 Courts do defer somewhat to the rulings of sister circuits,
even as this deference is less than that afforded to binding precedent. 6, On the
other hand, recent scholarship confirms Justice Scalia's notion that some
invocations of Skidmore by courts indicate no deference whatsoever. 6, I
contend that these cases were wrongly decided, as Justice Scalia would
presumably agree.
D. Rationalesfor Chevron and Skidmore
The Skidmore and Chevron doctrines have sometimes been associated with
somewhat different underlying rationales. The difference between the two
doctrines, as a practical matter, is indicated by the degree of formality of agency
procedure. The Court stated in Mead that delegated authority is the
foundational rationale for this distinction: "It is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure .... .""' The Court
has reiterated that the distinction between Chevron and Skidmore deference is
grounded in delegated authority on various other occasions.6
Beyond delegated authority, however, courts and commentators have
generally associated the Skidmore doctrine more clearly with agency expertise
than with political accountability. 6 4 The Court in Mead thus stressed that the
agency "can bring the benefit of specialized experience to bear on the subtle
158. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2358 n.2 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
i6o. See Wildermuth, supra note 155, at 1905. Recent empirical work by Bill Eskridge and Lauren
Baer confirms that the amount of deference given by the Court itself varies substantially,
depending on the context. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 5, at 1O98-1115. On the other
hand, these authors argue that the Court's articulated deference regimes have little effect on
the actual amount of deference an agency's interpretation of a statute receives.
161. See infra notes 171-174 and accompanying text.
162. 533 U.S. at 230.
163. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991).
164. But see infra notes 212-213 and accompanying text.
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questions in this case" in arguing that Skidmore warranted "some deference."' 6 s
Likewise, academic scholarship on Skidmore has tended to focus on the
expertise rationale;' 66 to my knowledge no one has argued, as I do, that
Skidmore decisions warrant deference due to political accountability. On the
other hand, both political accountability and expertise are often cited as
justification for deference in the formal Chevron context.'6 7
I do not intend here to arbitrate between the various rationales for agency
deference. Delegated authority, expertise, and political accountability are all
sensible reasons for deferring to agencies. Indeed, the Court's own recent
statements suggest it is quite comfortable with a blend of rationales.' 68
Nonetheless, the political accountability rationale has, I maintain, been unduly
neglected in the Skidmore context. Justice Breyer, among others, has said that
Chevron and Skidmore, rather than being distinct doctrines, are in fact simply
points on a deference continuum. 69 It thus follows that the political
accountability rationale, which figured so prominently in Chevron, should not
drop entirely out of the discussion in decisions governed by Skidmore.
Furthermore, the simple realities of agency decisionmaking support this logic:
political accountability operates, as a practical matter, nearly as much in the
informal context as the formal context. Thus, political accountability supports
giving Skidmore interpretations substantial deference.
III.SKIDMORE DEFERENCE IN ACTION
A. Current Circuit Court Practice
Circuit courts have implemented the Skidmore standard inconsistently.
While some courts do give substantial deference under Skidmore, others do not.
In recent, very informative empirical work, Kristin Hickman and Matthew
Krueger studied 104 cases in which federal appeals courts applied the Skidmore
standard to agency interpretation of statutes that the courts agreed were
165. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35.
166. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 118, at 737 ("Whether Chevron deference applies in a given
case should [turn] . . . on whether the materials at issue reflect and incorporate agency
expertise.").
167. See supra note 125.
168. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1172 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Certain
aspects of statutory interpretation ... are properly understood as delegated by Congress to
an expert and accountable administrative body.").
169. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 128, at 1248; Rossi, supra note 6, at 1138.
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ambiguous.17° This study shows clearly that many circuit courts are giving
agencies no deference under Skidmore.
Hickman and Krueger analyzed the reasoning in each case to determine
how the court was applying Skidmore and categorized the opinions into three
groups. The first were those that clearly gave the agency no deference, what the
authors call the "independent judgment" model. "' The authors found that
courts applied the "independent judgment model" in 20 of the 104 cases. The
agencies won exactly half of those twenty cases-exactly what one would expect
in cases in which courts treat the government like any other litigant.'72 The
second Hickman and Krueger classification was cases in which courts applied
contextual factors to the agency's interpretation. They found that courts
applied this "sliding-scale" model to seventy-five percent of the sample, and
the agency was victorious in sixty percent of these cases.' Last, Hickman and
Kruger labeled seven cases as "indeterminate," because the courts gave no
reason for their rulings in these cases other than a citation to the relevant
deference cases. In all seven such cases, the courts accepted the agency's
statutory interpretation.
The cases in which courts gave no deference are the primary target of this
Note. The political accountability of agencies justifies more deference than
these courts gave to the agencies in question. Such courts are acting out Justice
Scalia's worry that Skidmore deference is "no deference at all."'74 Courts
decided these cases inappropriately, giving too little weight to the fact that an
independent government actor had made a decision. Courts giving substantial
deference to the executive may still have decided that the government's
position was untenable in some of these cases. But an appropriate degree of
deference would almost certainly have meant that the government prevailed
more than half the time, the rate of any ordinary litigant.
It is worth noting that Hickman and Krueger's count may actually
underestimate how often courts are giving no deference in the Skidmore
context. In the cases categorized as instances of "independent judgment," the
court has clearly come to its own conclusion about the "best" reading of the
statute in question using the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation.
However, in the remaining cases, the mere fact that a court acknowledges
170. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 128, at 1259-67.
171. Id. at 1268.
172. Id. at 1276.
173. Id.
174. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2358 n.2 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
supra text accompanying note 158.
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deference hardly proves that that factor really influenced the decision. One
does not have to be a dyed-in-the-wool legal realist to believe that courts may,
from time to time, cite certain reasons as additional justification for decisions
that they have actually reached on independent grounds. Justice Breyer, for
one, has noted as much.' s7 Indeed, Hickman and Krueger rely on "the tone of
the court's rhetoric" for distinguishing between cases in which the court is
really exercising independent judgment, despite the mention of deference, and
those in which deference is actually playing a role in the decision. , 6 It is not
clear that we should give "tone" such weight in judging the cause of a court's
decision. In reality, even more than twenty cases in Hickman and Krueger's
sample may reflect no deference to the agency's decision.
My argument also helps to clear up two areas of confusion in Hickman and
Krueger's study, about two sets of cases. The first set of cases my theory
explains are the seven so-called indeterminate ones. As the authors note,
"courts occasionally cite Skidmore to justify deferring to the agency without
explaining whether or why deference is merited." '77 Hickman and Krueger are
unable to account for these decisions, stating that "applying deference in this
unconditional manner would seem to fit neither within the sliding-scale model
nor the independent judgment model of Skidmore, and no scholar has
suggested that Skidmore operates in this way.'1 78 It is precisely my point,
however, that political accountability gives the agency interpretation some
baseline authority; all other things being equal, the agency should win. That a
legitimate government actor has made a decision is, in itself, persuasive,
without any additional contextual reasons. 7 9 If a court believes that the statute
175. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 379
(1986) ("[O]ne can find many cases in which the opinion suggests the court believed the
agency's legal interpretation was correct and added citations to 'deference' cases to bolster
the argument.").
176. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 128, at 1269-70, 1274.
177. Id. at 1270.
178. Id.
179. A contrary view is expressed in Amy J. Wildermuth, Bringing Order to the Skidmore Revival:
A Response to Hickman & Krueger, 107 COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 20 (2007),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/xo7/20 Wildermuth.pdf. Although
Professor Wildermuth agrees with my view that Skidmore deference should reflect an
intermediate level between Chevron and no deference, she believes this deference is justified
only by agency expertise and/or process. Id. at 23. I disagree with Professor Wildermuth's
assertion that "parties are typically offered few, if any, opportunities to participate in the
adoption of nonbinding [informal] interpretations." Id. On the contrary, agencies have
strong incentives to be responsive to parties' views about a wide variety of agency
interpretations.
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in question is legitimately ambiguous, there is no reason why the court should
run through a variety of rationales just to determine that one statutory
construction is as good as the next. The court does not need to give reasons but
may simply defer to the agency. This is why the courts held for the agency in
all seven of these cases.
Additionally, my theory sheds light on another set of cases about which
Hickman and Krueger express concern: that in which courts applied only the
"validity" contextual factor. In 12 of the 104 cases, "a court purporting to
engage in Skidmore analysis only considered whether the agency's
interpretation was reasonable and ignored" the circumstantial factors.'s
°
Hickman and Krueger worry that such a decision "extends deference beyond
what Mead envisioned" because it gives deference "without regard to the
agency's interpretive process or procedures."'"' Again, a reasonable agency
interpretation should, all else equal, not need buttressing circumstantial factors
in order to be accepted by a court. When a court finds that an agency
interpretation is reasonable and then defers to the agency, it is essentially
saying that it has found the statute ambiguous and therefore sees no reason to
overturn the reasonable decision made by another legitimate government actor.
In fact, the cases in which the court cites only the validity of the agency's
reasoning are actually more similar than Hickman and Krueger may realize. In
the "indeterminate" cases, the court implicitly says that the agency
interpretation is "valid" (or "reasonable") merely by upholding it. The "validity
only" cases merely make that judgment of reasonableness explicit; after that,
the two sets of cases are the same in that no contextual factors are relied upon.
The contextual factors may be subsequently relevant if they support or
undermine the agency interpretation, but in lieu of either circumstance a
reasonable interpretation by an agency should be deferred to under Skidmore.
No additional reasons are necessary. It should be no surprise, then, that the
agencies won eight of these twelve cases-a 67% victory rate substantially
higher than the 58.2% rate of the remaining 67 sliding-scale cases. 1
82
B. The Persuasive Precedent Model
At the core of the argument about Skidmore deference is the meaning of the
phrase "power to persuade. " "' In those decisions in which courts have given
i8o. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 128, at 1273.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 1276, 1311-20.
183. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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no deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute, the agency is treated like
any other petitioner before the court, able to convince the court only on the
basis of the persuasiveness of its arguments. This practice ignores the fact that
federal agencies are legitimate government actors with political constituencies
overseeing their decisions, a fact which should lend their decisions persuasive
force on courts.
Courts have a readily available model for giving deference to decisions
having the power to persuade. This is the model of "persuasive precedent" -
the way courts treat the nonbinding decisions of other circuits.'8" Such
decisions are, by definition, not controlling, but still have substantial "power to
persuade" due to the respect one court has for the authority and legitimacy of
another court. Indeed, courts often cite other circuits' decisions without
delving into their reasoning; they recognize that the sheer fact that another
court has decided is itself "persuasive." In the Skidmore context, a federal
agency-another authoritative governmental body with substantial political
accountability- has made a decision, and courts should afford that decision a
similar degree of deference.
Courts afford persuasive precedent less deference than "binding"
precedent. Binding precedent reflects deference analogous to the stronger
Chevron deference. Yet while "persuasive precedent" does not have controlling
force, courts still treat such decisions with substantial deference and are
reluctant to split from other circuits without good reason.
85
When one court considers an issue previously decided by another circuit,
the court does not review the issue de novo, as it would the legal decision of a
lower court within its jurisdiction. Rather, the court respectfully reads that
decision and has, as the Ninth Circuit has articulated, at least a "presumption"
184. Tom Merrill and Charles Sullivan have both previously compared agency deference to
persuasive precedent. However, their analysis substantially differs from my own. Professor
Sullivan describes Skidmore as being similar to "persuasive precedent" only in a passing
footnote, as something of an afterthought. See Sullivan, supra note 146, at 1204 n.287.
Professor Merrill adopted the model substantially before Mead, and thus suggests the model
for judicial deference in all contexts. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, loi YALE L.J. 969, 1003-12 (1992). I argue, by contrast, that persuasive precedent
specifically fits midlevel Skidmore deference. Furthermore, Merrill offers little justification
for why the model is appropriate for deference to agencies, instead simply tossing it out as a
possibility. I give a justification for the model: the political accountability of agencies gives
them legitimacy worthy of respect.
185. On the distinction between binding and persuasive precedent, see generally 18 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 134.02 (3d ed. 1997).
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of following it.,86 The Seventh Circuit has explicitly deemed this an
"intermediate" obligation- somewhere between the decisions of the Supreme
Court (binding) and the British House of Lords (not at all binding)-to
"follow them whenever we can.' 8 Other circuit courts have similarly indicated
that they ordinarily will follow persuasive authority unless they have good
reason to differ. As the Eighth Circuit has described its practice on more than
one occasion: "Although we are not bound by [another circuit's] decision, 'we
adhere to the policy that a sister circuit's reasoned decision deserves great
weight and precedential value.""' 88 Likewise, the Federal Circuit has indicated
that "we accord great weight to the decisions of our sister circuits when the
same or similar issues come before us, and we 'do not create conflicts among
the circuits without strong cause. ' ' 88
Obviously, each circuit court is ultimately free to depart from the decision
of other circuits. Circuit courts are quite assertive about their right to do so.' 90
Even so, courts treat persuasive authority with a certain degree of respect,
showing a conscientiousness about considering the decision and departing
from it only for good reason. As Charles Sullivan explains, the "norms of
judgecraft require that persuasive authorities be dealt with appropriately . . .
[and] must be confronted precisely because the authority is an authority."' 9'
Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit confirms that "we would consider it
bad form to ignore contrary authority."' 92
186. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 257 F.3d 1071, 1077 ( 9th Cir. 2001) ("Our
court has provided us with the analysis to be followed: unless there are valid and persuasive
reasons to hold otherwise, we should not create an intercircuit conflict. That is, the
presumption is not to create an intercircuit conflict."). But see Wedelstedt v. Wiley, 477 F.3d
116o, 1165 (ioth Cir. 2007) ("Although this court is not bound by other circuits' precedent,
we are guided in our decisions by their well-reasoned and thoughtful opinions." (internal
citation omitted)).
187. Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7 th Cir. 1987).
188. In re Owens v. Miller, 276 F. 3d 424, 428-29 (8th Cit. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Auginash, 266 F.3 d 781, 784 (8th Cit. 2001)).
i89. Admiral Fin. Corp. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cit. 2004) (quoting Wash.
Energy Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cit. 1996)).
19o. See, e.g., Newsweek, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 663 F.2d 1186, 1196 (2d Cit. 1981) (splitting
from the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of a statute while stating that "it is well settled that
the decisions of one Circuit Court of Appeals are not binding upon another Circuit"), affd
on other grounds sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 462
U.S. 81o (1983).
191. Sullivan, supra note 146, at 12o5; see also Merrill, supra note 184, at 1007-o8.
192. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3 d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001).
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This model is appropriate for courts' treatment of agency interpretations of
statutes. The government agency's interpretation should be treated as "prima
facie correct," and then the court should look to the traditional contextual
factors to decide whether to afford the decision more or less weight. Agencies
should get a baseline level of deference-a "thumb on the scale"-and only
then should factors such as "expertise" or "consistency of decision" come into
play. If the court then decides to overrule the agency, it is free to do so, just as
one circuit is always free to split from another. However, as Professor Sullivan
notes, when one circuit decides to break from another's precedent, it "will often
go to great lengths to distinguish it, although there is no formal requirement to
do so[, a]nd, when such prior authority cannot be distinguished . . . , [the
court] will usually feel compelled to explain why it has reached a different
result. '" '93 In other words, while a court is free to disregard an agency
interpretation, it should feel compelled to give reasons for doing so, out of
respect for the political process that rendered that decision. It is wrong to toss
aside a government agency as if it were any other petitioner.
Courts have on a few occasions explicitly invoked the "persuasive
precedent" model of Skidmore deference. The First, Second, and Sixth Circuits
have referred to an informal agency decision as "persuasive authority."'94 Peter
Strauss has thus characterized court decisions as giving "weight" to Skidmore
agency interpretations, as opposed to "obedience" for those in the Chevron
context.' 9s Nonetheless, the language used by courts in describing the amount
of deference due under Skidmore is inconsistent and varies widely, from "some
weight" (but not "considerable weight") to "respectful consideration" to "a
"non-trivial boost." 9 6
The persuasive precedent model is consistent with the Skidmore decision
for several reasons. Although the decision makes no reference to the
accountability of the government agency in question, the tone of Skidmore is
quite respectful of the agency's authority. Justice Jackson states almost
reverently that "the Administrator's policies are made in pursuance of official
duty."' 9 7  He similarly notes courteously that "[t]he fact that the
Administrator's policies and standards are not reached by trial in adversary
193. Sullivan, supra note 146, at 12o6.
194. See New Hampshire v. Ramsey, 366 F.3d 1, 26 (1st Cir. 2004); White v. Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry., 364 F.3d 789, 812 (6th Cir. 2004); Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp.,
121 F.3 d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1997).
195. PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 371 & n.104 (2d ed.
2002).
196. Herz, supra note 146, at 132-33.
197. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
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form does not mean that they are not entitled to respect. " s9 Possibly most
important, prior to mentioning the oft-quoted contextual factors, the Skidmore
Court notes its respect for the agency's "body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' 99
This respectful tone is much like the one adopted by circuit courts in
dealing with the decisions of their "sister circuits."20 0 Courts are deferential to
the decisions made by other circuits, and they often cite the fact that a sister
circuit has made a decision as itself persuasive for deciding the instant case in a
particular way.2 ' The sheer fact that several other circuits have decided an
issue consistently is sometimes enough to persuade a court to rule in a
particular way. 20 2 Similarly, the fact that an executive branch government
agency has come to a particular decision in light of the political forces at play
and has persisted in defending that decision in litigation should be afforded
some respect by the courts.
Perhaps even more significantly, the same practical reasons for preferring
consistency between circuit court rulings on statutes apply to consistency
between agency and court statutory interpretation, as Justice Jackson himself
noted in Skidmore. Circuit splits are generally an undesirable state of affairs.
For one thing, prospective litigants in one jurisdiction rely on the decisions of
courts in other jurisdictions in coming to predict how their own jurisdiction
will rule on a given matter not yet considered. Since the majority of the time
courts do, indeed, follow their sister circuits, persuasive precedent is the best
(and often the only) way for people to foresee how they will be treated by their
own courts with respect to a particular issue. Furthermore, it violates basic
intuitions about the rule of law that like cases under the identical statute be
treated differently simply because a court in a different jurisdiction is
considering the matter. Recognition of this fact is, indeed, precisely why so
much of the Supreme Court's work consists of resolving circuit splits.
Similarly undesirable are splits between how agencies and courts interpret
the same statute. It is quite problematic for the federal government to be
enforcing and executing a statute under a particular standard, only to have
those actions be dealt with inconsistently on the relatively few occasions that
198. Id. at 140.
199. Id.
2oo. See, e.g., Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 998 (6th Cir. 2007) (revising a previous holding
"to incorporate some of the wisdom of our sister circuits").
201. See, e.g., Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass'n v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 457 n.7 (6th Cir. 2009);
Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 544 (3d Cir. 2007); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145, 1151 (iith Cir. 2006).
202. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 128, at 1270.
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the matter reaches the courts. Justice Jackson in Skidmore highlighted this
rationale for deferring to agencies: "Good administration of the Act and good
judicial administration alike require that the standards of public enforcement
and those for determining private rights shall be at variance only where
justified by very good reasons."" 3 The Court also echoed this sentiment
strongly in Mead when it emphasized "the value of uniformity in [the]
administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires."20 4
Thus, as circuit courts strive to avoid gratuitously creating splits, so too should
courts try to avoid creating inconsistency between how the government
enforces a statute in the executive branch and how the statute is interpreted in
the judiciary.
Furthermore, several prominent commentators have argued that deference
to agency interpretations is beneficial because it itself reduces circuit splits,
since disparate courts across the country will be less often independently
injecting their own judgment into disputes about statutory interpretation."°
These scholars have made the case in the Chevron context. However, the same
argument is, if anything, more persuasive in the Skidmore context, since such
decisions constitute the majority of agency action.
All other factors being equal, it is better for the decision of a legitimate
governmental actor to stand, so that people can rely on that decision as a guide
for their own behavior.
C. Current Supreme Court Practice
The Supreme Court's implementation of the Skidmore standard over the
last several years is substantially compatible with the model of deference
outlined in this Note. Broadly speaking, the Court operates with three levels of
deference: strong Chevron deference, intermediate Skidmore deference, and no
deference at all. However, the Court has not been especially consistent in the
language it uses when implementing deference. The Court has applied
Skidmore deference three times in the past six years.' ° In two of the decisions
203. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
204. 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).
2os. See Silberman, supra note 23, at 824; see also Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per
Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1118-29 (1987).
206. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243
(2006); Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004). The Court has
also mentioned Skidmore deference in the dicta of several other decisions, but did not find
the doctrine relevant in these instances because the statute in question was unambiguous.
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applying Skidmore, Federal Express and Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation, the Court has invoked a standard of deference quite similar to my
own, even citing political accountability as a rationale. In the third, Gonzales v.
Oregon, the Court appropriately gave the agency no deference because the
circumstances dictated, under the Court's existing doctrine, that even Skidmore
deference was inappropriate.
In Federal Express and Alaska, the Supreme Court gave informal
interpretations of statutes substantial deference under the Skidmore standard.
Furthermore, as I have suggested, the Court gave the agency reading of the
statutes meaningful initial deference and then used the contextual factors to
corroborate that initial respect. The key phrase used in the decisions
(apparently coined in Alaska) is that agency interpretations under Skidmore
deserve a "measure of respect. 20 7 In both, the Court adopted a noticeably
deferential tone toward the authority of the agencies in question. In Alaska, the
Court referred to the EPA as "the expert federal agency charged with enforcing
the [Clean Air] Act. ''2, In Federal Express, the Court said that the decision in
question "is a matter for the [EEOC] to decide in light of its experience and
expertise in protecting the rights of those who are covered by the [Age
Discrimination in Employment] Act.""0 9
It is particularly notable how much this latter language echoes Justice
Jackson's respect for agencies' "body of experience and informed judgment.""'°
The Court quite explicitly adopted the tenor of respect signified by Skidmore.
Perhaps more significantly, the Court called the agencies "expert" and cited
their "experience," but made no effort to explain what, in the context of the
cases, made the agencies' expertise particularly relevant. The Court instead
recognized the general legitimacy of the agency as the experienced executor of
the statute. Again, this confirms that agencies get deference -as the Court said,
"a measure of respect" -under Skidmore separate and prior to a consideration
of the contextual factors. In both Alaska and Federal Express, the Court then
went on to consider the consistency of the agency's interpretation, finding that
consistency corroborative of deference to the agency."'
See Merrill, supra note 184, at 976-77 (explaining the relationship between deference regimes
and statutory ambiguity).
207. Fed. Express Corp., 128 S. Ct. at 1156; Alaska, 540 U.S. at 488.
2o8. 540 U.S. at 492.
209. 128 S. Ct. at 1158.
210. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
211. Fed. Express Corp., 128 S. Ct. at 1156 (noting that "the relevant interpretive statement... has
been binding on EEOC staff for at least five years"); Alaska, 540 U.S. at 487-88 (noting the
"longstanding, consistently maintained interpretation").
119:2096 2010
ACCOUNTABILITY, DEFERENCE, AND THE SKIDMORE DOCTRINE
In fact, the Supreme Court in Federal Express explicitly cited political
accountability as a reason for deferring to agency authority in the Skidmore
context. After noting that "[r]easonable arguments can be made that the
[EEOC] should adopt a standard giving more guidance," the Court went out
of its way to state that "[f]or its decisions in this regard the agency is subject to
the oversight of the political branches."" 2 The Court cited as support for this
statement its own recent decision in National Cable & Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X Internet Services, a case decided under the Chevron
doctrine in which the court similarly cited the importance of political
accountability. 13 This citation confirms that, as I have argued, the Skidmore
doctrine has the same foundation as the Chevron line of cases, in which political
accountability was predominant. The Court's reference to this rationale in both
Federal Express and Brand X also suggests that the salience of political
accountability has not waned in the Court's thinking.
Giving the agencies substantial Skidmore deference, the Court thus upheld
the agency's statutory interpretation in both cases. Noting the statute's "less
than crystalline text," the Court in Alaska held that EPA's "rational
interpretation" was "surely permissible." ' 4 Similarly, in Federal Express, the
Court held that although "[r]easonable arguments can be made that the agency
should adopt a [different] standard," "[w]here ambiguities in statutory
analysis and application are presented, the agency may choose among
reasonable alternatives. 2 s15
The Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Oregon is admittedly less
compatible with substantial Skidmore deference. The Gonzales Court gave a
statutory interpretation of the Attorney General no more than nominal
deference before overturning his decision. Gonzales, however, represents an
unusual and indeed incoherent use of the Skidmore doctrine. The Court in
Gonzales afforded the Attorney General the appropriate amount of deference -
that is, none. Nonetheless, it should have explicitly stated that it was giving the
government zero deference, without ever invoking Skidmore.
A controversial informal Interpretive Rule issued by then-Attorney General
John Ashcroft triggered the Gonzales case. The rule stated that so-called
physician-assisted suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose" for prescription
drugs under the Controlled Substances Act and threatened to revoke the license
212. Fed. Express Corp., 128 S. Ct. at 1158.
213. 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) ("Filling these gaps [in ambiguous statutes] involves difficult
policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than courts.").
214. Alaska, 540 U.S. at 490, 493.
215. Fed. Express Corp., 128 S. Ct. at 1158.
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of any physician who prescribed drugs for that purpose.216 This provoked a
conflict with Oregon's Death With Dignity Act, which specifically allowed
doctors to prescribe drugs for patient suicide under certain circumstances.217
The Court found that the statute did not delegate authority for interpreting the
phrase "legitimate medical purpose" to the Attorney General, but rather gave
that authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.1 s
On this basis, the Gonzales Court, strangely, purported to give the Attorney
General Skidmore deference: "Since the Interpretive Rule was not promulgated
pursuant to the Attorney General's authority.., it receives deference only in
accordance with Skidmore." '219 This version of Skidmore deference proved to be
very minimal. Noting that "under Skidmore, we follow an agency's rule only to
the extent it is persuasive," the Court merely recited the usual contextual
factors, mentioned "the Attorney General's lack of expertise in this area," and
held that "we do not find the Attorney General's opinion persuasive.""
The key distinction between Gonzales and the other recent Skidmore cases is
that in Gonzales the Court found that the wrong person made the decision in
question -rather than that the right person made the decision but was wrong
on the merits. Of course, if one government official usurps the decisionmaking
authority of another, then that official's interpretation of the statute should
receive no deference under any theory.2 1' But that is no deference, not Skidmore
deference.
By invoking Skidmore in Gonzales, the Court seemed to be treating Skidmore
deference as a catch-all category for all situations in which the agency does not
receive full Chevron deference. Yet it is quite difficult to reconcile the
substantial "measure of respect" attributed to Skidmore in Alaska and Federal
Express with the lack of deference afforded to the Attorney General in Gonzales.
Indeed, notice how bizarre it is that the Gonzales Court even considered the
Skidmore factor of expertise. If the Attorney General, like the Surgeon General,
happened to possess a medical degree, would it really make any difference,
216. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 254 (2006).
217. Id. at 249.
218. See id. at 267-68.
219. Id. at 268.
22o. Id. at 269.
221. Cf. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 569 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("I find it somewhat surprising that an agency [the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board] not responsible for tax matters would presume to dictate what is
or is not a deductible loss for federal income tax purposes. I had thought that that was
something within the exclusive province of the Internal Revenue Service .... Certainly, the
FHLBB's opinion in this respect is entitled to no deference whatsoever." (emphasis added)).
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given that the statute delegated the decisionmaking authority to the Secretary
of Health and Human Services? The answer seems clearly to be no.
In fact, the case most similar to Gonzales is not Mead, but rather FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp." In that case, the Court decided that the
Food and Drug Administration did not have the authority to regulate cigarettes
as a drug-delivery device under the statutory scheme of the FDCA and other
statutes specific to tobacco. 3 The intent of Congress not to give the FDA
regulatory authority precluded giving the agency any deference - in this
instance, the Chevron deference that would have been due, since the agency
utilized notice-and-comment rulemaking. Likewise, the statutory scheme in
Gonzales, because of the interlocking of various statutes, did not give authority
to the Attorney General to make the relevant decision, thereby not warranting
the deference the Attorney General would have received -Skidmore, since the
decision was informal. In both cases, then, the appropriate amount of
deference was none at all.
CONCLUSION
In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has thus proven
amenable to giving agencies an intermediate level of deference in the Skidmore
context, as modified by the presence or absence of various contextual factors.
On the other hand, the Court's articulation of this doctrine has been muddled,
perhaps indicating that the Court itself does not have a clear model in mind for
how to implement the standard.
This Note has aimed to give both context and content to the consideration
of informal statutory interpretation by government agencies. Modern political
science has come to a consensus about the broad accountability of government
agencies. This accountability reaches beyond the relatively narrow focus of
legal scholars on formal procedures or direct ties to the electorate. Government
officials are politically accountable through a wide variety of mechanisms, both
formal and informal.
On the other hand, though political accountability does justify judicial
deference to agency decisions, political considerations do not track particularly
well with the formality of agency procedures. Formal procedures such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking have their virtues. By occurring publicly,
notice and comment lends transparency to the process by which agency policy
222. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
223. See id. at 132-33 ("[T]he FDA's claim to jurisdiction contravenes the clear intent of
Congress."); see also supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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is made. This process may also slow down agency deliberation, ensuring that
the agency considers all possible considerations before coming to a decision.
And notice and comment may play an important role in creating an
administrative record for later review by courts. What formal procedure does
not do, however, is ensure the political accountability of agency decisions.
This understanding of how government officials actually behave suggests
that Skidmore deference should be substantial, but less than Chevron. Rather
than the full deference favored by Justice Scalia or no deference whatsoever,
Skidmore deference should be intermediate, analogous to the respect a court
gives when considering persuasive precedent. Courts should readily recognize,
and be able to implement, this familiar model.
